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A Demonstration of Contextural Analysis, a Methodology for 
Reconstructing Polycontextural Configurations, Taking Interviews on 
Boundary Violations in Teacher-Student Relationships in Tibetan 
Buddhism as an Example
Werner Vogd & Jonathan Harth
Abstract: In many fields of qualitative research we are faced with the problem of how to deal 
methodologically with the simultaneous presence of different speaker positions, institutional logics 
and the fragmented ways of relating to the self and the world that are associated with them. In our 
initial attempts to address this problem from both the theoretical and methodological standpoints we 
have found Gotthard GÜNTHER's (1978) theory of polycontexturality to be particularly well suited to 
this task. In this article we draw on linguistics and the literary sciences, where the concept of 
polyphony (BAKHTIN 1984 [1929]) has gained a certain prominence over the last decades, to show 
how a many-valued hermeneutic approach can be used to analyse interview transcripts. We 
demonstrate our use of this approach in a study on the problem of boundary violations in the 
relationship between teachers and students in Tibetan Buddhism. In this study we used the 
interpretation of interviews with students of Sogyal Rinpoche to show how ambivalence regarding 
the teacher's integrity is processed and how the associated systemic dynamics can be 
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"Given that we are vulnerable to the address of others in ways that we cannot fully 
control, no more than we can control the sphere of language, does this mean that we 
are without agency and without responsibility? For Lévinas, who separates the claim 
of responsibility from the possibility of agency, responsibility emerges as a 
consequence of being subject to the unwilled address of the other" (BUTLER, 2005, 
p.84).
"I am not primarily responsible by virtue of my actions, but by virtue of the relation to 
the Other that is established at the level of my primary and irreversible susceptibility, 
my passivity prior to any possibility of action or choice. [...] Rather my capacity to be 
acted upon implicates me in a relation of responsibility" (p.88). 
"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. Logic pervades the world: the 
limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in 
it, and this, but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding 
certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic 
should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits 
from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we 
cannot think we cannot say either" (WITTGENSTEIN, 2016 [1921], 5.6-5.61).
1. Introduction1
We have previously presented contextural analysis as a methodological approach 
to the reconstruction of complex ways in which we relate to ourselves and the 
world and the social arrangements associated with these modes of relating 
(JANSEN, VON SCHLIPPE & VOGD, 2015; VOGD, 2014). Contextural analysis 
allows us to take reflection seriously as an empirical phenomenon. In this context 
reflection is understood as the production of selfhood and world-hood. Viewed 
from the inside, reflection appears existential, that is, as a certain mode of being-
in-the-world, while from the outside it appears as the typical systemic mode of the 
animate world, wherein living creatures are not only part of the world, but also 
have a world, produce this world together with other living creatures and have to 
behave in accordance with what they have produced.2 [1]
Thus, the ways in which people relate to themselves and the world—and the 
associated metaphysics and ontologies—appear as constellations of multiple 
factors that arise out of specific life and organisational processes and can be 
reconstructed empirically. This follows from the fact that "what is" (classical Greek 
ὄν ón = "being") does not result from a logos (λόγος) that is external to human 
practices, but from a logic of practice. [2]
A number of authors, in particular Bruno LATOUR (2007 [2005]), have pointed 
out that rendering the epistemic status of concepts—including objects and 
1 The text was translated by Deirdre WINTER, B.A. Hons. Interpreting and Translating (French 
and German). Quotations from non-English texts were translated by her, otherwise the English 
original or current translations were used.
2 For a view from existential philosophy see HEIDEGGER (2006 [1926]), for whom human beings, 
as actors, differ from things in that they can produce their own ontology.
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subjects—fluid in this way is necessary, precisely for empirical reasons, since in 
everyday life people change their ontological and epistemic perspectives like 
models change their clothes. For example, "people adopt different stances, 
depending on the context: as subjects or objects, autopoietically closed monads 
or process structures that are open for communication and can be influenced, 
either as actors or as being subject to the actions of others" (JANSEN & VOGD, 
2014, p.455). As far as their theories about themselves are concerned, they 
orient themselves towards idealist, constructivist or realist ideas, or towards 
monistic or dualistic, materialist or transcendentalist thought. "According to the 
empirical version of this perspective their practices have therefore always 
appeared to be pervaded with metaphysics and—insofar as these practices 
become reflective—with philosophy, ontology and epistemology" (ibid.). From this 
perspective we may and can no longer conceptualise either human practices or 
the (empirical) social research that throws light on them without metaphysics and 
epistemology, since it follows from this systemic approach that, as a way of 
relating to self and world, no practice (including that of empirical research) is 
possible without reflection. However—and this is actually the point—it is now no 
longer possible to assume a position (a God's eye view, so to speak) from which 
we could claim epistemic and ontological validity. Rather, which epistemic and 
ontological configurations do justice to the constructive aspects of the 
circumstances is only revealed in each respective situation, in which, depending 
on the practice, many different forms are possible.3 [3]
We need to change our thinking about the way we human beings understand how 
life forms relate to ourselves and the world, and specifically how we conceive of 
subjects and actions. To do this, we must free ourselves from the assumptions 
about ontology and causality that we find in anthropology and social theory, but 
without throwing the baby out with the bathwater, i.e. without giving up the 
possibilities for reflection offered by metaphysical concepts. We do not want to 
abandon ontology altogether, but no longer see it as referring to a fixed basis of 
being or reality, but rather as being constructed by a practice that generates 
certain reconstructible and designatable forms (as in "doing" ontology). We can 
best gain access to this practice by studying the use of language, since it is in 
language that we find the operations we use to construct our modes of relating to 
ourselves and the world. Moreover, in speech acts it becomes clear how we 
3 For LATOUR it is the inventions of the philosophical texts that provide us with the language we 
need to understand the complex metaphysical configurations that are to be found in the 
practices of everyday life (but not the reasons given for these inventions): "How could enquirers 
listen to a housewife, a clerk, a pilgrim, a criminal, a soprano, and a CEO and still succeed in 
following what they express if they had no Hegel, no Aristotle, no Nietzsche, no Dewey, no 
Whitehead to help them? Have those writers not done quite a lot of useful work to open up what 
an agency could be? It does not mean that philosophers will know better, go deeper, be more 
profound than social scientists, nor does it mean that they will provide sociology with its 
'foundation' or indulge in 'meta-theory'. It means that cutting the social sciences from the 
reservoirs of philosophical innovations is a recipe to make sure that no one will ever notice the 
metaphysical innovations proposed by ordinary actors—which often go beyond those of 
professional philosophers. And the situation will be even worse if social scientists not only 
abstain from metaphysics, but take as their duty to cling to the most limited list of agencies, 
ceaselessly translating the indefinite production of actors into their short one. Actors have many 
philosophies but sociologists think they should stick to only a few. Actors fill the world with 
agencies while sociologists of the social tell them which building blocks their world is 'really' 
made of" (2005, pp.51-52).
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actualise these processes of relating performatively, i.e. how we elaborate and 
stabilise them in our social interactions. Thus, if we are sensitive to the 
polyphonic richness of linguistic utterances as we interpret texts this can help us 
to reconstruct the complexities of how people relate to themselves and the world 
as expressed in everyday life. In this way we can bring together the empirical 
study of complex linguistic practices which at first glance appear confusing and 
contradictory and the theory of how people relate to themselves and the world in 
multiple contexts in a way that is productive. [4]
We are now able to employ a "flat ontology"4, according to which what appears to 
be subjective and what appears to be objective, what appears to be fact or what 
appears to be construction is not predetermined. This opens up a "empty-place 
grammar" or "empty place structure" (GÜNTHER, 1976a, p.214) which, leaves 
open the question as to at which locus something is subjective or objective and 
shows how what happens at a certain position in a social relationship conditions 
what is constellated at another position, and vice versa. In this way we can 
usefully combine a linguistic, literary textual analysis which has no means of 
addressing the complex logical entanglements of social relationships, and social 
theory, which focuses mainly on the fundamental differences between the I and 
Thou perspectives and the associated multiple observational relationships and 
conditions. [5]
We first became aware of the need for a polycontextural methodology in our 
research on organisations, where there are different positions and reflective 
perspectives which are as a rule irreconcilable with each other but exist side by 
side. This fact is so obvious that we could not fail to see it and take it into 
consideration in the methods we employed in our empirical studies.5 We initially 
noticed the problem in our studies on doctors' decision-making processes in 
hospitals, and later came across it again in some research we did on supervisory 
boards with worker participation and on management.6 This led us to develop a 
further research field to investigate educational processes. Like Winfried 
MAROTZKI, who has also drawn on GÜNTHER's notion of a polycontextural 
logic, we see education as a "process of transformating modes of relating to self 
and the world" (MAROTZKI, 1990, pp.41f.) In this context we demonstrated the 
usefulness of the polycontextural approach in research on psychiatry and 
psychotherapy (VOGD, 2014), where the fracturing of modes of relating to self 
and the world (i.e. impaired autonomy) and the attempt to re-balance them are a 
central issue.7 The methodological advantages of the polycontextural perspective 
have also been evident in our studies on Buddhism in the West. Since the paths 
4 By "flat ontology" we mean, following LATOUR (2005, p.165), an anti-essentialist attitude which 
distances itself from understanding things or phenomena that are external to the practice that 
constitutes them as subjects or objects, i.e. from ontologising them in a predefined way (see 
also JANSEN & VOGD, 2014).
5 Support for the use of such methodological strategies is evident in the success of the 
Institutional Logics approach even in work by researchers in the English-speaking countries, 
which tends to be less theory-oriented (FRIEDLAND & ALFORD, 1991; THORNTON, OCASIO 
& LOUNSBURY, 2012).
6 See, for example, JANSEN (2011, 2013), VOGD (2004, 2007, 2009, 2017a), and VOGD, FEIßT, 
MOLZBERGER, OSTERMANN and SLOTTA (2017).
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of Buddhist training are oriented towards producing a comprehensive change in 
trainees' views of themselves and the world here—the dynamics described above 
can be rendered visible and examined "in vivo", as it were (VOGD & HARTH, 
2015; VOGD, HARTH & OFNER, 2015). [6]
In our previous papers we focused mainly on the metatheoretical aspects (the 
introduction of the polycontextural perspective) and the results of analyses of 
these aspects (to demonstrate the successful application of the polycontextural 
perspective). The analysis of the contextures and their inter-relationships was 
carried out after completing the two steps that traditionally constitute the 
documentary method, i.e. "formulating interpretation" and "reflecting 
interpretation".8 However, to date we have only provided condensed overviews of 
the contextural analysis itself, i.e. the process by which polycontextural 
formations and "arrangements" can be identified by analysing text material (be it 
interviews or notes on participant observation).9 We have explicitly described how 
we get to the analysis from the interview or observation notes. In the present 
article we would therefore like to provide a detailed description of the possibilities 
7 As WITTGENSTEIN put it laconically: "The solution of the problem you see in life is a way of 
living which makes what is problematic disappear. The fact that the problem is problematic 
mean's that your life does not fit life's shape. So you must change your life, and once it fits the 
shape, what is problematic will disappear" (1998 [1977], p.31).
8 For an introduction to the documentary method see BOHNSACK (2010a, 2010b). The 
documentary method does take into account that verbal utterances are polyvalent and classifies 
them according to a multidimensional typology of intersecting experiential spaces (see e.g. 
BOHNSACK, 2001). However, since the analysis is focused on a specific experiential space 
(the conjunctive experience of a collective we), in practical research the focus tends to be 
placed more on commonalities than on all the divergences that point towards polycontextural, 
multicentric conditions. The theory of social phenomenology does include the aspects of 
communication that are covered by a common-sense understanding of language (SCHÜTZ, 
1981 [1932]). However, in his endeavour to avoid drawing premature conclusions about the 
problem of intersubjectivity SCHÜTZ placed too strong an emphasis on the mediating function 
of language to be able to capture its polyvalent aspects (BERGER & LUCKMANN, 2003 [1966]). 
It is thus not possible to translate the theoretical understanding of social phenomenology into a 
systematic hermeneutic practice. In contrast, NASSEHI and SAAKE (2002) were well aware of 
the polyvalence of semantic relations and have chosen to make it the starting point for their 
reconstructive social research. They accordingly tried to free themselves from the 
methodological rigidities of standardised interpretation procedures, preferring instead to be 
somewhat more broadly interested in how meaning is created in a given situation, i.e. in terms 
of the social, factual and temporal connotations (SAAKE & NASSEHI, 2007, p.235). There is of 
course a risk, if we dispense with a metatheoretical and methodological focus, that the process 
of interpreting social realities will become too arbitrary. This would run counter to a systems 
theory position, which assumes spheres of meaning that can be clearly distinguished from one 
another.
9 The goal of contextural analysis is to identify logical places in which people relate to themselves 
and the world, in particular by bringing into alignment different perspectives that focus on the 
social dimension of meaning expressed, for example, by means of certain prepositions, 
bracketing, distancing etc. One issue of interest is how the boundaries between the origins of 
meanings and contextures are determined. These processes can be observed when, for 
instance, problems and tensions that arise in a narrative are marked by certain linguistic 
practices—such as distancing or switching the frame of reference—and indicate a change in the 
patterns of attribution. It is also important to take a multivalent hermeneutic perspective and look 
at how "contextures are opened and closed by means of various transjunctional operations" 
(JANSEN et al., 2015, §30). This should include looking for practices that are used to bring 
different reflective spaces into a stable relationship with each other, for instance, by means of 
taboos that mark where the train of thought has been broken off or barriers have been erected 
against reflection. "Contextural analysis can then be applied in a second step to discern how 
different reflective perspectives mutually condition each other, i.e. how they stabilise each other 
in relation to how the individual relates to him- or herself and the world" (§48).
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of polycontextural hermeneutics, drawing on resources from linguistics and 
research on polyphony in literary science.10 [7]
In Section 2 we first give an introduction to the subjects of polycontexturality and 
contextural analysis, following which we present the linguistic and semantic 
approaches to analysing polyphonic text structures (Section 3).11 In Section 4 we 
demonstrate contextural analysis, taking some interviews on the relationships 
between western students and their teacher in a school of Tibetan Buddhism 
(Rigpa) as an example. Following a brief discussion of the subject of Tibetan 
Buddhism, in Section 5, in Section 6 we conclude with a discussion of the areas 
in which contextural analysis can be usefully applied and how it is related to the 
documentary method. [8]
2. Polycontexturality
We would like to start by defining polycontexturality in the following way: there are 
different logical locations—e.g. speakers and listeners in different positions—, 
from which the actors perceive and interpret what happens in their relationships 
independently. However, what is perceived and what is interpreted are not 
independent of each other, but depend on one another in a non-trivial way. [9]
Polycontexturality is manifested on three different levels.
1. On the level of psychological systems: ambivalences and uncertainties 
regarding what has been perceived are associated with corresponding 
thoughts. Conflicting sensations and feelings that may be more or less intense 
may then occur (for example, a swinging back and forth between trust and 
mistrust, understanding and confusion).
2. On the level of language: due to polysemic words and the fundamental 
difficulty of deciphering the nature of the message that is being conveyed, 
speech acts always appear ambiguous, which can lead to differing 
interpretations which are, however, coherent in themselves.
3. On the level of communication: as locutionary acts follow locutionary acts, 
certain systemic patterns can develop which can be started over and over 
again, i.e. they can become locked into typologies that are familiar in this 
social system. [10]
What is special about the polycontextural perspective lies not least in the fact that 
individual people, milieus, groups, relationships and organisations etc. do not 
have to be at one with themselves, but that inconsistencies, incommensurabilities 
and logical contradictions between the various different aspects that are 
simultaneously present at any one time are the rule rather than the exception. [11]
10 See also KRZYCHALA (2019) for an example of how BAKHTIN's ideas on polyphony can be 
utilised in reconstructive social research.
11 We thank Julia GENZ for her valuable comments on this subject.
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Moreover, the polycontextural perspective assumes that the above-mentioned 
levels are inter-connected. What is meant by interconnection here is that what 
happens and develops on the level of awareness is linked to communication, and 
vice-versa, but without its being possible to reduce one to another in a trivial way. 
The relationship is one of conditioned coproduction12 (FUCHS, 2015, pp.139ff.), 
i.e. of development in reciprocal interdependence, not a causally determined link. 
Communication cannot directly influence the awareness of another person within 
in interactive system of interaction. However, what happens in it—for instance, an 
aggressive act that needs to be responded to—does condition subjective 
experience, just as, conversely, what happens in conscious awareness influences 
the utterances that enter into the communication. [12]
Thus, subjectivity is not an independent entity, but only develops in response to a 
certain relational constellation.13 In BUTLER's (2005, p.86) view, "[p]rior to the 
ego taking a decision, the outside of being, where the Ego arises or is accused, is 
necessary," and—echoing LEVINAS—the "I" does not owe its subjectivity to 
itself, but to the interdependence of polycontextural relationships. Her remark in 
this context that we are vulnerable to the address of others in ways over which we 
have no control, just as we are unable to control the sphere of language, 
(BUTLER, 2005, pp.84f.), nicely captures what co-production is. [13]
The three levels psychological systems, language and communication produce 
each other reciprocally, but without its being possible to reduce the one to the 
other. Coming into contact with or speaking to the subjectivity of another 
subjectivity which is neither accessible nor controllable, induces polycontexturality 
which then becomes possible to experience, in the form of tension and 
contradiction, as one's own subjectivity. Subjectivity appears not as the cause, 
but as the result of a complex nexus of inter-related perceptions and 
interpretations. The actors who are enacted in this way will now themselves 
challenge and unsettle other actors with their own actions, since the competent 
subject with a certain level of experience will know all that one can do with words
—not least lie and deceive. In other words, we can perform linguistic actions 
which exploit the lack of a clear dividing line between providing information and 
communicating in order to distract the recipient from our own motives, or to 
conceal them. From this point on communication becomes complicated, itself 
polyphonic, permeated by many voices and contradictory interpretations. 
12 SPENCER BROWN (1994 [1969], p.VII) also used the term conditioned coproduction in his 
logical treatises on self-reference, echoing the Buddhist concept of dependent origination.
13 That this fundamental divergence between the level of subjectivity and the level of the context of 
communication can be exploited for reconstructive social research has already been 
demonstrated by Ulrich OEVERMANN (1993) with his "objective hermeneutics". Take, for 
instance, the example of a mother who says to her thirteen-year-old son that he must not eat 
any of the cake on the table, and when he is unable to resist it nonetheless, remarks indignantly 
that he knows that he is not allowed to do so. Even if in such a case it is not possible to predict 
what happens in the boy's consciousness and what it will mean for his future actions, we can 
still deduce from the structure of the interaction what ambivalences will be associated with this 
demand and challenge. Confronted with his mother's expressed expectation he can no longer 
surrender to his desire, but will be split in one way or another, and then only be able to come to 
his own decision (be it to obey, to assert his autonomy by defying her or some other option). 
This will then lead to a certain relational pattern between mother and son, which will in turn 
configure the subjective experience of each of them.
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Awareness also becomes polyphonic—at one and the same time we are aware of 
both trust and mistrust, both believe the words we have heard and doubt them, 
switch between different perspectives and the associated multitude of dissonant 
voices, which are, however, not independent of each other, but themselves in 
some way relate to each other, or elicit each other in the first place. [14]
Thus it is precisely for this reason that the theory of polycontexturality is so 
interesting from a methodological point of view, since it is only within the logical 
space14 of a polycontextural logic that the relationships between different 
subjective positions and the resultant configurations can be represented in a way 
that is free of contradictions, i.e. as a polycentric arrangement in which different 
things can be the case at different locations. The basic idea is to spread logical 
sub-systems—which GÜNTHER (1978, p.16) called "contextures"—across 
different logical locations, the laws of classical logic applying within each separate 
contexture. In other words it is clearly distinguishable within a contexture what is 
(true) and what is not—whereas from the standpoint of a different logical locus 
something quite different can become the issue. [15]
Thus empirically, polycontexturality is always already relevant when two persons 
come together, since then two obviously quite different logical locations come into 
contact with each other. What one person sees and holds to be true does not 
have to be the same as what the other perceives and considers to be correct. For 
GÜNTHER, analytically we must first differentiate between the three positions "I", 
"it" and "you", from which we can then derive different relationships of reflection. 
The "I-it" relationship represents the relationship of a subject to an objectifiable 
object. It is a simple contexture. A state of affairs either exists or does not exist. 
For example, whether a seminar instructor is overweight can be decided by 
stating the necessary criteria. If somebody asks us, we may not immediately 
know the answer, but we can look to find out what is the case. [16]
However, with the "I-You" relationship that problem is different: in a reciprocal 
social exchange relationship the You appears as another I who is him- or herself 
constituting a reciprocal subject-object exchange relationship—and thus also 
another contexture. The You has a world of his or her own which is not accessible 
to the I. While I may be able to suspect, empathise with and assume what the 
other person to whom I am relating is experiencing, I can never really know. Even 
if I ask the other person and they give me an answer, I can never be absolutely 
certain whether they are telling the truth or whether they are lying—or whether I 
am understanding what they say in the way they mean it. [17]
When my "I" reflects on the "You", it adds something to the other person that is 
not covered by my mirroring their being in my subjectivity (I cannot see what is 
going in their psychological system, so I have to construct it). There in fact no 
objective criteria that I could use to assess whether the "You" really has 
14 Here the term "logical space" is used, following WITTGENSTEIN, to mean the entirety of the 
structure of possible facts and circumstances that can be true or false. "The facts in the logical 
space are the world (2016 [1921], 1.13). Moreover, "[a] proposition determines a place in logical 
space" (3.4), and "[t]he truth-conditions of a proposition determine range that it leaves open to 
the facts" (4.463).
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"subjectivity" or whether I am actually facing a highly developed, structurally 
determined machine, a being without consciousness—a kind of "zombie". We 
cannot experience other people's subjectivities or prove their existence 
objectively, but only ascribe them by reflecting. And yet whatever the result of this 
reflection, when I engage in it something that is independent, a third thing, enters 
into the relationship between me and you. [18]
As outlined above, the relationship between "I" and "You" appears as a 
relationship that takes the form of a complex network which is realised by 
interpretation and ascription, not by creating an objective representation of an "it" 
in the "I". This makes it possible to relate to each other in different ways. For 
example, the "I" can try to imagine the relationship between "You" and "It" (i.e. 
the perceptions and perspective(s) of another person). [19]
The reflective distance thus produced enables a process to take place that leads 
us to question and doubt the certainty of our direct perception. The contexture 
that is developed from the egological perspective of an other self is now rejected, 
that is, dismissed as wrong, irrelevant or invalid. In its place we become aware of 
the relationship between perspectives. Thus one could, for example, say "You are 
mistaken in your perception", or "You are trying to deceive me", or conversely, "If 
that is how you see and experience it then I must be wrong, because I trust you 
and your assessment". There could also be doubts about what is the case. You 
could perhaps say (or think), "I don't know", "Perhaps you are mistaken", "I want 
to believe you, but I don't quite trust you", or "Perhaps this is about something 
quite different, perhaps you aren't interested in me or a serious relationship but 
simply want to exploit me". Thus it is not only the statements themselves, but the 
space in which these statements make sense or are called into question, rejected 
or changed. These few examples alone are enough to demonstrate the richness 
of the epistemic structure which arises even in a simple four-part "I-You" 
relationship. It becomes clear that the indeterminacies and uncertainties cannot 
be dissolved by means of logical analysis, but must be taken seriously as 
inherent constituents of a polycontextural configuration—that is, of a configuration 
that arises spontaneously as soon as different perspectives come into play.15 [20]
As we have pointed out above, these processes cannot be described using 
bivalent logic since this is no longer a situation in which an observer simply 
perceives and recognises objects that either are or are not. Rather, as 
ESPOSITO (1993) remarked as well, in an encounter with other observers 
anything we can negate by means of logical operations is itself constructed. 
Thus: "The operation of negation presupposes a more fundamental operation, i.e. 
a caesura, which results in an object being identified as different from something 
else" (p.105). Accordingly, for GÜNTHER (1976b) negation is the starting point 
15 KAEHR (1993) described the four-part polycontextural arrangement as follows: "What is an 
operator at one locus is an operand at another locus, and vice versa. The circularity of the self-
referentiality of operator and operand is distributed across four loci, in analogy to the figure of 
the chiasma. The circularity dissolves into a chiastic mechanism of order and exchange 
relations in which the two fundamental circularities between the operator a [...] The relations of 
exchange and order, the hierarchy and heterarchy of the operativity and relationality are based 
on and condition each other" (pp.171f.).
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for developing a polyvalent logic. It thus appears as a transjunctional operation in 
that on the one hand it constitutes the unity of two values as a contexture 
("something is the case" versus "it is not the case") and on the other hand it is 
possible to relativise or negate the contexture itself (from a different perspective 
something else is the case). Thus by negating we can develop not only one 
contexture, but more and more contextures as we add new perspectives. If a 
person uses a transjunctional operation this indicates that they perceive different 
contextures, since the negation can refer to a contexture (i.e. to a mode of 
observing and differentiating) itself. Not only the observed value, but the mode of 
observation itself can be negated. [21]
Propositions (which distinguish between true and false), perceptions (which 
differentiate between object and subject), relationships (which can be trusted or 
mistrusted) and many other things are thus not given per se, but in a sense 
"observed into" the world. Human beings (and other living creatures) are not 
simply part of the world, but have a world, that is, they construct the 
differentiations which then constitute their world. In order to avoid risking the 
misunderstanding to which constructivist solipsism falls prey, we want to stress 
that the reflective resources that this requires do not lie in the actors themselves, 
but that an actor needs to have contact with and be addressed by other persons 
in order to develop these resources. Distinctions such as true and false, subject 
and object, etc. are not given per se, but constructed in the context of the history 
of a specific relationship. They themselves result from a complex polycontextural 
arrangement. How we relate to ourselves (i.e. whether we feel at one with 
ourselves or not) is also dependent on further positions in the adjacent space and 
how it its values are defined (Here space is seen as a logical space, not as a 
physical space.) [22]
Formally, GÜNTHER (e.g. 1979) described the structure of these configurations 
as "kenogrammatics" or also "empty-place grammatics", i.e. in terms of 
"morphograms" or "empty-place configurations". This structure shows the 
different inter-related positions. The values applied at the different positions are 
not yet occupied but are nonetheless dependent on each other insofar as what 
determines the factors pertaining at one locus also conditions the possibilities that 
may obtain at another locus. Furthermore, what appears as a subject or an object 
in an interaction in a given situation correspondingly results from the overall 
arrangement.16 One of the main advantages of empty-place grammatics is that it 
depicts a "structural layer" "in which the difference between subjectivity and 
objectivity first has to be established and cannot therefore yet be presupposed at 
that place" (1976a, p.216). Or to put it differently, what appears to be subjective 
or objective is not based on a pre-given ontology according to which there is a 
16 KAEHR and MAHLER (1995) put it this way: polycontextural logic (PCL) "is characterised by the 
distribution and mediation [i.e. mutual influence and coordination] of different logical 
contextures; within each individual contexture all the rules of classical propositional logic have 
full validity. As a result of the mediation the individual contextures are not isolated from each 
other as in a hierarchy of types, but linked by means of particular inter-contextural transitions. 
Since it is the case both that the contextures themselves can be described and also that how 
they are mediated can be depicted without contradiction, circular and self-referential structures 
can be modelled within the PCL without contradictions" (p.22).
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subjective interiority at the one position and the objective facts of an externally 
given world at the other. Rather, like "true" and "false", "subjective" and 
"objective" are categories, each of which results from a specific configuration of 
positions, which then in given situations cause certain things to appear as 
subjective, objective, true, false or other.17 [23]
In this way, the theory of polycontexturality initially provides us with an instrument 
with which we can analyse how people relate to themselves and the world or a 
group. We can now examine from the standpoint of which contexture or which 
frame of reference, to use the terminology of BOHNSACK (2017, p.63ff.), 
experiences are being made and actions carried out. Or, as LATOUR (2013) put 
it, every contexture corresponds to a "mode of existence" and each mode of 
existence has its own ontology and metaphysics. A mode of existence is not only 
part of an overarching network of relationships which it (co-)conditions, but is also 
located through the experience of having a world as opposed to being part of a 
world. It is specified in the form of the metaphysical distinctions that each mode 
of existence makes. A mode of existence is defined by its own "preposition", each 
of which is associated with its own specific "interpretative key" (p.57) and then 
correspondingly "speak[s] well about something to someone" (p.144), thus doing 
justice to the logos of this mode of existence.18 [24]
It is now also possible to reconstruct how other positions or places (i.e. specific 
modes of existence, LATOUR, 2013) are related to from this position. We can 
then examine whether other perspectives are negated, or whether their own 
intrinsic logic is recognised, but rejected or at least accepted as partly justified 
and related to our own position. Here polycontextural analysis, with its inclusion of 
the corresponding transjunctional operations, allows a differentiated examination 
of the respective relationships (GÜNTHER, 1976b distinguished between partial, 
completely undifferentiated and completely differentiated rejection, for a 
description of the methodology see JANSEN et al., 2015). [25]
In sum, to date contextural analysis has proved to be a useful metatheoretical 
mode of conceptualisation in various fields of research. However, since there is 
17 The fact that truths and objective facts do not result from a perception (positivism) or an 
observation (naive realism), but are produced by an over-arching relational context was 
recognised by Karl POPPER (1996 [1992]). He therefore also did not see objectivity as 
something individual that can be assigned to a person, but as the systemic property of an over-
arching cultural context. "It is completely erroneous to assume that the objectivity of a science 
depends upon the objectivity of the scientist. And it is completely erroneous to believe that the 
attitude of the natural scientist is more objective than that of the social scientist. The natural 
scientist is just as partisan as anyone else, and unless he belongs to the few who are constantly 
producing new ideas, he is, unfortunately, often extremely biased, favouring his own ideas in a 
one-sided and partisan manner. Several of the most outstanding contemporary physicists have 
even founded schools which set up a powerful resistance to new ideas. [...] What may be 
described as scientific objectivity is based solely upon that critical tradition which, despite all 
kinds of resistance, so often makes it possible to criticize a dominant dogma. In other words, the 
objectivity of science is not a matter for the individual scientist but rather the social result of 
mutual criticism, of the friendly-hostile division of labour among scientists, of their co-operation 
and also of their competition. For this reason, it depends, in part, upon a whole string of social 
and political circumstances which make this criticism possible" (p.72).
18 For more on the relationship between LATOUR's actor-network theory and the theory of 
polycontexturality see JANSEN and VOGD (2014) and for more on the relationship between 
LATOUR's late work and sociological systems theory see VOGD (2015).
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no direct route from a logical analysis of relationships of reflection to the everyday 
language used by the persons whom we have interviewed, in the past we have 
not previously presented an explication of the intermediate steps required to get 
from the text to a polyvalent hermeneutical analysis. We are now able to fill in this 
gap, using tools taken from a branch of the linguistic sciences that focuses on 
polyphony and polysemy and has systematically developed a number of 
resources for this purpose. [26]
3. Polyphony in the Linguistic Analysis of Literary Texts
The concept of "polyphony" was first introduced into linguistics by BAKHTIN 
(1984 [1929]) in his book on DOSTOEVSKY's poetics. He proposed that the 
composition of DOSTOEVSKY's works is multi-voiced or polyphonic and does not 
culminate in a harmonious unity. Rather, the voices of the narrator and those of 
the characters are woven together (for example, a character uses the 
expressions and ways of speaking of a different person). BAKHTIN believed that 
in this way Dostoevsky showed that the human individuality of the characters in 
the story are constantly being shaped and modified by dialogue, and that for this 
reason the process never comes to an end. [27]
DUCROT (1984) added a further specification by differentiating between voices 
and standpoints.19 In this view, the voice refers to speakers, where first the author 
of a text himself or herself appears, and also to further voices that he or she 
embeds in the form of indirect and direct speech. Conversely, standpoints—or to 
use the terminology of logical spaces—places—can be introduced by numerous 
different methods, including indirect speech, bracketing or simply the use of 
nouns that indicate a relationship to someone else. Let us take an example from 
our own empirical data: in his interview with us Mr Martini20 talked about his 
teacher Sogyal Rinpoche. "Yes, Sogyal sometimes says 'these are really very, 
very degenerate times, that somebody like me is a teacher whom you follow". 
Here we have first the voice of the speaker and then the voice of the teacher, 
which is inserted in direct speech. We can also identify three locations: the 
superordinate location of the speaker ("Yes, Sogyal says ..."), the location of 
Sogyal ("these are really very, very degenerate times ...") and the location or 
perspective of the students whose teacher Sogyal is ("whom you follow"). [28]
GÉVAUDAN (2010) has pointed out that the differentiation between voice and 
location also bears a resemblance to AUSTIN's (1962 [1955]) speech act theory, 
which distinguishes three levels. The locutionary level is that on which the act of 
uttering takes place, utterances then appearing in texts as "voices", several of 
which can be embedded (e.g. in the form of quotes), in addition to those of the 
author. The propositional level is the content level of speech acts, according to 
which (as in the above example) different locations can be identified in the 
semantic analysis. The third level, termed the illocutionary level, indicates that 
speech acts not only say something, but also do something, in a social sense. 
19 We would like to thank Julia GENZ for her valuable comments on this subject.
20 Names have been changed to ensure anonymity.
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They can report or claim (representatives), order, give advice or request 
(directives), express a commitment to a future action (commissives), express 
inner and emotional states (expressives) or urge or encourage others (appeal 
function). There are also what are termed performative speech acts which do 
what they say as they are being said. In the performative execution of a speech 
act somebody is placed in a position through the mere action of speaking—as, for 
example, at christenings, in blessings or appointments. [29]
GÉVAUDAN (2010) made two further differentiations in regard to voices, one in 
relation to the question as to for which propositions (and to what extent) a 
speaker (voice) or an embedded speaker (location) assumes responsibility for a 
statement (proposition). And secondly we can also differentiate between whether 
they do this in an "objective" or a "subjective" modality. Here is another example 
that is relevant to the subject matter that we will later be using to demonstrate 
contextural analysis. Take the following sentences about the holiness of a 
spiritual teacher.
1. He has reached the state of liberation from greed and aversion.
2. He appears to have reached the state of liberation from greed, aversion and 
ignorance.
3. I know that he has reached the state of liberation from greed, aversion and 
ignorance 
4. I think that he has reached the state of liberation from greed, aversion and 
ignorance. 
5. I doubt that he has reached the state of liberation from greed, aversion and 
ignorance.
6. I assure you that he has reached the state of liberation from greed, aversion 
and ignorance. [30]
In the first of the above sentences, the speaker claims from an objective 
perspective that the teacher has achieved the above-mentioned spiritual goal, 
which in Buddhist circles is generally termed "total enlightenment". Sentence 2 
retains the objective perspective, however, the speaker does not assume any 
responsibility for the veracity of the statement since the verb "appears to" is used 
to indicate that the difference between appearance and reality is indissoluble. In 
Sentence 3, reference is made to the location of a subjective perspective ("I"), the 
speaker's own position being presented as certain ("I know"). In Sentence 4 the 
speaker's own position is expressed as being uncertain. The speaker says that 
s/he "thinks" that it is true that this state has been achieved. In Sentence 5, the 
speaker expresses doubt about the assertion made in the subjective position in 
Sentence 1. Sentence 6 is particularly interesting because it is a performative 
speech act insofar as starts by establishing a subjective location, but the speaker 
then turns back on him-/herself reflexively and avers a fact that goes beyond his 
or her own position. The subjective position is in a sense duplicated (since the 
word "assure" refers to the speech act itself, and the voice and the location are 
spread over two positions). [31]
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Readers who are well-versed in the thought of WITTGENSTEIN and in particular 
his logical-philosophical investigations in the "Tractatus" (2016 [1921]) will initially 
see that such a sentence seems nonsensical since the affirmation is a tautology 
and cannot therefore add anything to the truth value of the claim made in the 
sentence. However, if we take into account WITTGENSTEIN's late work (1963 
[1953]) we can see that this is a special kind of language game. When we use 
concepts such as certainty, doubt and belief a series of family resemblances 
must appear, the most important of which is that they must appear nonsensical if 
we see them as internal states, whether from the position of the I or from the 
position of the You. (They do not do at all what they purport to do, i.e. distinguish 
between certainty and uncertainty or even affirm the objective status of what is 
asserted). The subjective sensations and perceptions of the Thou position are 
simply not accessible to anyone (and this also applies, of course, to the claims 
about enlightenment or liberation of a spiritual teacher, as in our example). In 
contrast, from the subjectivity of the position of the I, attitudes such as certainty or 
doubt are simply what they are—mental attitudes that exist in the here and now, 
no more and no less. [32]
However, this does not mean that a claim such as that expressed in Sentence 6 
is meaningless, but its meaning cannot be deduced from its content as a 
proposition, but from the special relationship that becomes evident on the 
illocutional level: in the social nexus of a community of individuals who want to 
believe in liberation the performative act of assuring someone actually makes 
them liberated. However, the exact sociodynamics can only be revealed by a 
contextural analysis that takes into account the configurations that make these 
acts possible and stabilise how the persons involved relate to themselves and the 
world. Thus, in this context in particular it must be pointed out that what appears 
to be subjective or objective cannot be deduced on the basis of a pre-given 
ontology, but on that of the relationships between the positionings within the 
complex possibilities afforded by the grammar of our language. [33]
As NØLKE (2006) has demonstrated, when we look at polyphony from the 
perspective of linguistics we find a further linguistic indication of the division into 
two voices, i.e. the use of a negation particle. In order for us to be able to negate 
something it must have been asserted beforehand, which inevitably points to two 
standpoints that appear simultaneously (e.g. if we tell someone not to think of a 
blue elephant they will not be able to avoid imagining a blue elephant, i.e. what 
was negated). Now let us look at the following two sentences.
7. The master does not live in abstinence or celibacy.
8. The master is not enlightened. [34]
In Proposition 7 a behaviour is postulated that it is possible to verify, and in 
Sentence 8 one that is not possible to verify21, i.e. the behaviour is first posited as 
21 What is most important for this differentiation is the reference to the fact that it is in principle 
possible. While the Thou-perspective draws on a knowledge that is per se inaccessible and 
thus never verifiable, the other meanings are at least in principle—if not perhaps in actual fact 
conclusively—verifiable.
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being within the logical space of possible facts, and then this is immediately 
reversed. Thus the two postulates are juxtapositioned in space. Even if the 
negation makes the contradiction of the statement the most likely option, the 
other side is invoked as a conceivable and tenable position, in order, either indir-
ectly or directly, to draw attention to the positions of the speakers who have not 
decided to refute the claim, but to affirm it. (Which is the case can only be 
decided hermeneutically, by considering the context in which the sentence is 
uttered.) However, with the exception of ORT (2007), the procedures used for 
text analysis in literary science have not to date included the transjunctional 
operations of negation that refer to the positive (and the negated) postulates 
themselves. If we look again at the examples we can say, for instance: 
9. It is not important whether the Master lives in celibacy, but that he has never-
ending compassion with all sentient beings. [35]
In regard to Sentence 8 it is also possible to reject the meaning of an internal 
state, for instance, if we then claim that:
10. What is important is not whether the master is really enlightened, but my 
relationship to him. [36]
If we now consider the polyphony that is expressed in these sentences we see 
that the number of voices has at least doubled, since the content of the original 
proposition is still included, despite the negation. The resulting polyphony can, in 
turn, be multiplied by referring to further positions that are embedded or come to 
light as voices of the authors. The sentences that are constructed in this way can 
then refer to other sentences to create configurations or "arrangements", to stick 
to the musical metaphors that can have any degree of complexity. [37]
Let us now leave the literary sciences, where we (theoretically, at least) find 
poetic texts with contents that can be constructed with an almost infinite number 
of degrees of freedom, and turn to issues of the social sciences. The narratives 
that we find here (be it in interviews or observation transcripts) necessarily have 
limited degrees of freedom (not everything that is conceivable in fantasy is 
feasible). This results from the fact that the individual positions that arise in social 
arrangements are not independent of each other, but are reciprocally condition 
each other. However, this need does not prevent us from using the tools of 
linguistic analysis that we have just presented. [38]
However, in this context it should be pointed out that it is not possible to discern 
the polyphonic or polycontextural structures of texts by means of lexical analysis 
alone. It is not enough simply to analyse linguistic modes (such as the 
subjunctive and the indicative), the ordering of parts of sentences, the use of 
conjunctions and punctuation etc. in order to reconstruct the intertwined webs of 
voices and locations. This is evident from the simple fact that in analyses we are 
often less concerned with the level of content (the propositions) than with the 
performative (illocutionary) level, since, as GÉVAUDAN (2010, pp.44ff.) has 
shown for various European languages, the expressive, appellative and 
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representational (conative) functions (commissives) and the obligations of 
speakers and listeners cannot be clearly distinguished in terms of their 
illocutionary meanings. We therefore need a hermeneutics that is founded on a 
theory of logical spaces which needs to have been developed deductively.22 For 
the purposes of the task in hand this means that we expect to find actors who 
have long since been socialised into polycontextural conditions, that is, who not 
only know about other perspectives, but have also learned on a performative level 
to deal with fuzziness and indeterminacy. [39]
In the context that concerns us here, rather than being a problem, the fact that 
forms of linguistic expression are polyvalent would seem to be simply another 
argument for a polycontextural perspective which assumes that the empty places 
associated with these uncertainties must be filled in an in a way that is 
conditioned and not arbitrary. They do not follow identifiable patterns, each 
expressing a certain systemic configuration according to which how one empty 
place at one position is filled restricts what is possible at another position. These 
overarching patterns—BATESON (1979, p.8) spoke of the "pattern[s] that 
connect[s]"—can be reconstructed in comparative sequential and case analyses. 
We now shift our attention from the linguistic disciplines that address polyphony 
and present an example of contextural analysis in which the above-mentioned 
resources are employed and explain their use. [40]
4. An Example of the Conduct of Contextural Analysis Demonstrated 
in an Interview About a Problematic Teacher-Student Relationship
The following analyses are based on interviews carried out in a project entitled 
"Buddhism in the West" that was funded by the German Research Foundation. 
As this article is focused mainly on methodological issues and not on issues of 
religion for reasons of space in what follows we shall limit ourselves to those 
context details that are necessary to understand what we are discussing here. 
We have also already published some detailed reports on our studies (HARTH, 
2020; VOGD, 2017b; VOGD & HARTH, 2015; VOGD et al. 2015). [41]
We present excerpts from three interviews with students of Sogyal Rinpoche, 
who founded an international network of centres and groups known by the name 
of Rigpa in 1975.23 Rigpa is one of the most successful groups of Tibetan 
Buddhism in the West. However, since 1995 there have repeatedly been 
allegations that Sogyal behaves and leads his life in a way that is inappropriate 
for a Buddhist teacher. Sogyal Rinpoche himself considers himself to belong to 
Nyingmapa, a school of Tibetan Buddhism whose teachers (the great majority of 
22 In an article written in 2010, GÉVAUDAN presented a similar recapitulation of research on 
polyphonic linguistics: "it is not possible to arrive at a concept of modality that is coherent and 
provides a satisfactory explanation using semasiological methods. This is so not only because 
they are based on an inventory of forms of expression that have been arbitrarily compiled, but 
also and especially because they attempt to derive a semantic category from morphological 
criteria. In contrast, it is evident even from this small example, that typological studies on 
modality are most usefully conducted using an onomasiological approach, i.e. starting from a 
theory of modality that has been constructed deductively, as proposed here" (p.63).
23 See https://www.rigpa.org [accessed on January 21, 2019].
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whom are men) do not observe/feel committed to celibacy, unlike, for example, 
those of Gelugpa (one of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism), to which the 
Dalai Lama belongs. At public events Sogyal Rinpoche also insists that he is a 
representative of what is known as crazy wisdom. He claims that this permits him 
to perform unusual and transgressive acts if these promote the development of 
his students (LARSSONS, 2012). In July 2017 eight students from the inner circle 
of Rigpa wrote a twelve-page open letter to Sogyal LAKAR, in which they made 
accusations of serious abuse (they used the teacher's family name LAKAR and 
not the honorary title of "Rinpoche", as otherwise customary).24 [42]
On August 1, 2017 the Dalai Lama mentioned during a public lecture in the 
district of Ladakh in northern India that his friend Sogyal Rinpoche had fallen from 
grace and that his own students had therefore publicised their criticisms, as he 
had already recommended some years previously.25 In an open letter dated 
August 11, 2017 Sogyal LAKAR publicly announced his resignation as a spiritual 
teacher from all organisations bearing the name Rigpa. [43]
Our interviewees were a novice who was reflecting on her first encounter with 
Sogyal Rinpoche, a member of the staff of a local Rigpa centre and a man who 
had completed a three-year retreat26 at the headquarters of the European Rigpa 
centre in France. We have selected those sections of the interviews which 
address the teacher-student relationship. In particular we have carried out 
comparative interpretations of sections of the interviews in which the interviewees 
spoke of problematic behaviour of their main teacher. Although we re-interviewed 
a number of respondents in the longitudinal study we carried out in 2017 and 
2018, here we are discussing only those interviews that we conducted before the 
scandal was made public, i.e. in 2013 and 2014. From a methodological point of 
view the polyphonic and polysemous narrative structures are more interesting 
than the students' later, more unequivocal reports. These interviews and those 
we conducted with students who had dropped out and had already left Rigpa at 
an earlier point have also been included in a monograph in which one author has 
addressed the subject in more detail on the basis of this material (VOGD, 2019). 
The longitudinal design allowed us to draw conclusions as to the way in which 
positions and arrangements were interwoven with each other by comparing 
different positions (in this case those of novices, advanced students and students 
who had dropped out) at different points in time (before and after the public 
announcement of the scandal). In this way we were also able to throw some light 
on overarching structural dynamics of the community and the Rigpa organisation. 
In contrast, in the context of the present article our main objective is to present 
the methodology of contextural analysis in more detail as we applied it to some 
interview material that is sufficiently complex and polyphonic. [44]
24 See https://buddhismus-aktuell.de/diskussionen/debatte-um-sogyal-rinpoche/dokument-2-brief-
von-sogyal-rinpoche-an-seine-sangha-juli-2017.html [accessed on March 23, 2018].
25 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wP4rsM7AZQ [accessed on March 22, 2018].
26 Traditionally in Tibet lamas would withdraw from all worldly commitments during their training 
and completed a three-year phase of intensive study and meditation. Sogyal Rinpoche led a 
retreat for western students at his centre in France from 1992-1995.
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4.1 Ms Klinge, the novice
As they begin to engage with Tibetan Buddhism, students, and western students, 
in particular, initially experience the prominent role of the teacher as a 
considerable imposition, which is, however, balanced by the hope that they will be 
able to profit from the teacher's power and holiness. Whatever the case may be, 
to start with, especially, this results in a highly ambivalent relationship. As an 
example of the reflections and expectations that students may have about their 
"crazy" teacher when they start their practice, we present an interview with a 
Rigpa novice, Ursula Klinge, in which she describes how she thinks about what 
the crazy wisdom could be about. At the time of the interview, Ms Klinge was 43 
years of age. [45]
The passage we present is about the question of whether Ms Klinge has already 
recognised Sogyal Rinpoche as her teacher or master. She responded by talking 
about what happened at a retreat where she and her husband met Sogyal 
Rinpoche for the first time. 
Interviewer: "[So your husband] didn't have anything to do with it, to begin with? Or 
was he perhaps a bit interested? [...]"
Ms Klinge: "Exactly, and I, exactly, I did manage to persuade him to go with me to the 
Winter Retreat, to Sogyal Rinpoche and it was an enormous event with 500 
participants. And my husband is an introverted person. I'm not super extroverted, but 
I do seem to be more so than he is. And he was simply overwhelmed by the number 
of people. It was too much for him. He said, "It's too much for me". And then he said, 
'Well, he's putting on an act here' and I found that difficult when my husband said that 
because, for me it isn't an act. And still, I did find some things difficult to understand, 
when Sogyal Rinpoche was sitting on the stage phoning his mother in Tibet. Well, I 
don't know (laughs)."
Interviewer: "What was that?"
Ms Klinge: "He called his mother and all he said was, 'Ama, ama' and then he talked 
in Tibetan and I kept thinking, 'Why's he doing that now?" I didn't understand. And 
then, yes, I don't know, whether he was sometimes also teaching something, that is, 
o.k., that that was important for his mother, she was supposed to listen, too. But 
somehow [it] was. I must say, I found that disconcerting. I was disconcerted and 
Stefan [the director of her local centre] is something like my teacher here, you could 
say, and he said he was the one who who was running the course and he said, 'If you 
follow Sogyal Rinpoche you must be clear that he is also a dynamic teacher'. He's 
said to have kicked a table off the stage in Berlin and apparently he did it three times 
before the audience started to catch it. (Laughs) That's just to give you an example."
Interviewer: "Yes" 
Ms Klinge: "I haven't seen him do anything like that, but I would perhaps find that 
disconcerting, too. Well, but o.k., I have read that some masters throw stones at their 
students until they faint, somehow, but then they've reached a higher level because 
the master has hit energy centres with the stones. Yes, but I mean, for me with my 
western mind some things are difficult to understand, know what I mean? I'd think 
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that's abuse, like, somebody should report him. (Laughs) I don't know. How much is 
he my master? I'm afraid of being disrespectful if I say he's not my master or 
something like that. And it's not true, either. But I'm also afraid to say he's my master 
and to come out with that." [46]
We can pause here for a brief analysis and start by looking at the voices and 
positions that emerge in the narrative. Ostensibly, what we have here is direct 
speech spoken by the interviewer and by Ms Klinge. We also have another four 
voices embedded in Ms Klinge's narrative: what her husband said, ("It's too much 
for me"; "He's putting on an act here"); Sogyal's phone call ("Ama, ama") and 
what Stefan, her teacher from her local Rigpa centre, said ("If you follow Sogyal 
Rinpoche ..."). At various points Ms Kling also quotes herself word for word and in 
an embedded form (e.g. "I kept thinking, 'Why's he doing that now?"; "I must say 
I found that disconcerting". The text is already complex enough due to the 
distribution of the voices, but becomes more complicated when we also bring the 
embedded positions into the picture. Here the following actors appear (each voice 
also appears as a position): the 500 participants of the retreat; Sogyal's mother, 
Sogyal and his students at a retreat in Berlin; the master Ms Klinge had heard 
about and the students at whom he threw stones. In addition, Ms Klinge's I-
position is duplicated because she appears as both subject and the object of a 
situation that she is describing, and at different times. Moreover, by integrating 
systems theory into our contextural analysis we can identify three further 
generalised societal positions: that of the law ("that's abuse, that should be 
reported") and something that one can perhaps call an academic stance which 
does not believe in subtle energy centres ("with my western mind"). The third 
position may not initially be directly evident to the reader, but can be inferred from 
the overall context of the text, namely the transcendence that a student is 
presumed to be able to achieve because of the teacher's transgressive behaviour 
and boundary violations ("then they reached a higher level"). This is a reference 
to the spiritual goal that motivates people to engage in such a path. [47]
In the next step of the analysis, we can look at how the interviewees described 
their attitudes, i.e. what appeared objective or subjective to them, what epistemic 
status they assigned to the individual speech acts and, in turn, what was their 
appraisal of it, if they had one. Sogyal's strange behaviour during the retreats was 
seen as an objective fact, the epistemic status in regard to the event in Berlin 
being limited somewhat by the words "is said to have", but without going as far as 
to doubt the statement. Likewise Ms Klinge's husband's statement, which she 
reports in direct speech as an objective fact ("Well, he's putting on an act here"). 
Interestingly, from her own subjective perspective she adds "for me it isn't an 
act". Even though she offers a divergence between two perspectives—in other 
words, two different voices are presented the same time, she decides on 
certainty, on what she determines "is" (certainty, not doubt). She goes on to 
evaluate on the one hand the divergence ("I found that difficult"), and on the other 
when we analyse the polyphonic structure we find that despite having committed 
herself to her subjective view that Sogyal's behaviour was not putting on an act, 
she is not clear about what it in fact was. She assesses the epistemic status quite 
unequivocally as unclear ("Well, I don't know"). However, for her this not-knowing 
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is apparently not unproblematic, but disconcerting, inappropriate. Her use of the 
reflexive pronoun in German ("mich befremdet"—Eng. "I found that 
disconcerting") indicates that she is not managing to reconcile how she is relating 
to the world (to Sogyal's behaviour) in this situation with how she is relating to 
herself (feeling disconcerted). [48]
In her narrative, we then find a reference to an attempt by a third person, Stefan, 
who is also a representative of her local Rigpa centre, to mediate. Interestingly, at 
this point she also makes a statement that reveals her attitude to Stefan: she 
explains that she sees Stefan as her teacher (she has been attending a 
meditation course led by him for some time, from which, as she mentions 
elsewhere in her interview, she has greatly profited). [49]
As she continues, she weaves her teacher's interpretation that Sogyal's 
behaviour is intended as a lesson ("he's [...] a dynamic teacher") into the narrative 
as an additional voice, but this fails to reassure her: on the contrary, it bothers her 
more. Rather, remembering what she has read about dramatic teaching methods 
in the literature leads her to take the position of an enlightened democratic 
society that doubts esoteric explanations and sees physical attacks as punishable 
acts. And yet the narrative does not end in the certainty of an assessment of what 
the case is, but in a renewed expression of the status of her own subjective 
position. Not knowing, again, results not in a harmonious form, but in confused 
ambivalence. When she tries to arrive at a final evaluation of the question of 
whether she sees Sogyal as her master she becomes embroiled in a polyphonic 
mesh which contains four positions. From the standpoint of one of these positions 
she answers the question in the affirmative, from that of another in the negative, 
from a third she considers that a negative assessment would be "disrespectful" 
and from a fourth—that of the generalised third of society ("to come out with 
that") it seems problematic to answer it in the affirmative. [50]
We can also enrich the interpretation with a separate and more exact analysis of 
the illocutionary level, for instance by looking at the commitments that Ms Klinge 
makes (the commissives) or at how she verbalises inner states (the expressives). 
In the context we are considering the following passages are of interest in regard 
to this aspect. [51]
The statement "Stefan [...] is something like my teacher here, I'd say" finishes 
with a performative speech act that emphasises what she is saying (she is 
already speaking) once more as something that has been said. In a sense here 
she is in a sense establishing the definition of a relationship in a special way. Or, 
to compare it with her relationship to Sogyal, while she cannot see Sogyal 
unequivocally as her master, it is not only possible, but necessary for her to see 
Stefan as her teacher, in light of the history of their interactions. Whatever that 
may mean (e.g. how wise, experienced or knowledgeable she considers him to 
be), the nature of the relationship between them does not seem in question for 
her. [52]
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In contrast, the statement "I must say, I found that disconcerting", expresses that 
she experienced the relationship as problematic. Here again, she stresses what 
she has just said once again by means of a performative speech act. The word 
"must" could be understood both as a commitment (as in, "I owe it to myself to 
say so") and as an appeal (e.g. in order to alert the listener to the fact that 
something is not o.k.). We do not have to commit ourselves to a conclusive 
interpretation here, but can rather appreciate the polyvalency that was already 
expressed in the ambivalence which we found above. At all events, closer 
analysis of the illocutionary level reveals further clues which can be used to 
identify the configurations that emerge as in a polycontextural hermeneutic 
approach.27 With this we can conclude our analysis of the polyphonic aspects of 
the text. [53]
However, the instruments of literary analysis do not suffice to gain an 
understanding of the overall structure. To do this we need to find an approach 
that gives us a overarching view. This is only possible with contextural analysis, 
which gives us an account of the configuration of the empty places as in 
"morphogrammatics" and demonstrates how the values in the places are mutually 
conditioned. The voices and positions are now systematically related to each 
other. To repeat, a place stands for a contexture, each of which represents a 
logical position at which a proposition is two-valued (something is or is not) and in 
which the principle of tertium non datur (no third [possibility] is given) obtains. 
Correspondingly, when we bring together the text passages we have just 
reconstructed we can establish four propositions and their negations. 
1. He's (not) putting on an act.
2. Sogyal teaches (doesn't teach).
3. It is (not) abuse or (not) deception.
4. He is (not) my master.
5. It is subjective, not objective (and vice versa). [54]
Since according to the morphogrammatics of a polycontextural configuration the 
propositions occupy different logical positions, formally any combination of these 
positions initially appears conceivable, e.g. "Sogyal objectively abuses his 
students, he is nonetheless a master and from my subjective perspective his 
performances are not putting on an act, but teaching." Or: "For me he is not a 
master and thus he doesn't teach me anything, but from an objective perspective 
he is a teacher of Tibetan Buddhism." [55]
Empirically, however, here we can see how the overarching social configuration is 
conditioned, which brings Ms Klinge to oscillate between two variations which are 
mutually exclusive. "Sogyal puts on an act and deceives and abuses his 
students" versus "Sogyal is an out-of-the-ordinary teacher who can lead his 
students—including me—to transcend their egos by unusual means." Following 
27 It will not be necessary to conduct such a detailed analysis in all cases. However, here we want 
to show what hermeneutic tools can be used to gather information on how contextures are 
structured.
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LATOUR (2013) we could also say that Ms Klinge vacillates between different 
modes of existence in each of which something different holds true.28 [56]
Ms Klinge continues to shuttle between these two alternatives—the fear of 
manipulation and the hope that transcendence could result from the teacher's 
clever intervention—in the following excerpt from the interview.
"Perhaps that's just our western mind, because we haven't yet grasped, they say he 
works with our ego, except that in order to do this, like to tickle our egos or that we 
look at our issues a bit. But of course then I'm also afraid of being manipulated, like, 
yes, if I were now to stop completely and run after him blindly. On the other hand 
Sogyal Rinpoche says, 'Work with your doubts too, or look at your doubts. We are in 
the West here', he says, 'Masters of doubting and we doubt so much that we can 
never even perceive the true path, because all we do is question, brood and doubt', 
to put it in my own words." [57]
The question as to why Ms Klinge considers only these two alternatives is easy to 
answer from the interview. Her options are restricted by the fact that on the one 
hand significant others from the Rigpa community to whom she has already 
developed a relationship testify to Sogyal Rinpoche's merits. This is only possible 
through a performative speech act (e.g. "I testify to the fact that Sogyal Rinpoche 
is an enlightened, unconventional master") since the you-perspective is 
inaccessible to Ms Klinge from the contexture of her own subjectivity, i.e. if she is 
to believe something it can only be shown as in a performative act. Even if 
Stefan, Ms Klinge's teacher, can only claim (not prove) that Sogyal is a real 
master, this assumption nevertheless becomes important and instructive in the 
social arrangement. For her to reject Stefan's performative speech act would 
simultaneously mean calling her relationship to him (and thus also her 
relationships with her community of practitioners) into question. Accordingly, if 
she wants to fit in with the social dynamic she has to believe what the speech act 
conveys, even if she cannot really believe it. On the other hand because its 
structure is polycontextural, modern society has built up positions of reflexivity 
from which statements with a claim to absoluteness—which can only be believed
—must, quite rightly, be doubted (e.g. law, science, democracy). Authorities are 
no longer believed merely because other authorities confirm them. The fact that 
these two variants are so stable in Ms Klinge's mind is therefore due on the one 
hand to the social dynamic of the local Rigpa association, where it is especially 
the middle level teachers (known as "instructors" in Rigpa) who play an important 
role, since with their performative speech acts they decide what is (in 
WITTGENSTEIN's terminology) "the case" (2016 [1921], 1). And on the other 
hand it stems from the forms of reflection of modern society. [58]
28 The question as to what is the case is, as we have also shown with reference to the polyphonic 
view, not directly dependent on the question as to whether what happened was ascribed 
objective or subjective status. Thus, for example, something (such as "drama", "a lesson" or 
anything else (e.g. "he kicked the table off the stage") can appear to be objective fact, but this is 
independent of the ontological decision as to what is "the case", just as it is independent of what 
subjective epistemic status is assigned, such as if one says, "I or you only dreamed that or 
mistakenly thought it was so."
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Since for Ms Klinge both the experience of community and participation in society 
are paramount, at this point in time the dilemma seems to her to be insoluble. 
She needs more stabilising factors to influence the co-production of this dilemma 
and allow her to arrive at a stance that is unequivocal. Her current doubts cannot 
therefore simply be transformed into trust or certainty. However, whether such a 
shift is possible when students have got to know Sogyal Rinpoche over a period 
of many years is a different question. [59]
4.2 Thrusting doubt aside—Mr Martini, a course instructor at the local Rigpa 
centre
We therefore now take a look at the narrative of an interviewee who got to know 
Sogyal personally in various different contexts during his work for the Rigpa 
association and himself leads meditation courses at a west German Rigpa centre. 
For reasons of space we cannot explicate all the steps of the text analysis and 
therefore present only the results of the contextural analysis in detail. [60]
At the time of the interview Peter Martini was 48 years old and had been active in 
the Rigpa association for over ten years. The interview took place in 2016, that is, 
before the scandal was made public. Mr Martini nonetheless spontaneously 
addressed the criticism of Sogyal Rinpoche that was already occasionally leaking 
out, without being asked. 
“Well, if you see it like that or more or less there are a lot of er things where they say, 
'Yes pfhh pfhhh, he he does his his thing or does his own thing or mmh lives in luxury 
or somehow has affairs with women or things like that.' But I don't want to check up 
on things like that [...] of course pfhh/ I try/ we talk about it or so, when things like that 
happen. Then it gets talked about, then it gets talked about, what do you think about 
it, what happened, what newspaper article is that, did you see that or something like 
that.' But then I try not to look at those things because/ I don't want to have such 
doubts. And [...,] if there are somehow injustices or inconsistencies that other people 
see or experience then I have to say, ok, that's your thing. Of course it's difficult 
because you'll/ because you can't get of rid of this objective element." [61]
A detailed analysis of the interpretation reveals that Mr Martini was drawing 
attention to the fact that there were reports of facts regarding Sogyal's behaviour 
that could actually be checked and were therefore objective and were also seen 
critically by other people. He continues that it reports have been noted in the 
Rigpa community and that have people compared them to their own perspectives 
("what do you think about it") but Mr Martini—and this is a constitutive element of 
his associated ways of relating to himself and the world—actively tries not to look 
at the details of the allegations ("I try not to look at those things") in order to avoid 
the potential conflict shaping his relationship to his teacher (don't want to have 
such doubts"). At the same time here we see a second form of negation, i.e. he 
rejects the subjective speaker position of all the "you" perspectives that have 
problems with Sogyal's behaviour ("that's... your thing"). But Mr Martini's active 
negation of doubt and the divergent you-positions does not eliminate the problem 
that he has negated ("Of course it's difficult ... because you can't get rid of this 
FQS http://www.qualitative-research.net/
FQS 20(1), Art. 21, Werner Vogd & Jonathan Harth: A Demonstration of Contextural Analysis, 
a Methodology for Reconstructing Polycontextural Configurations, Taking Interviews on Boundary Violations 
in Teacher-Student Relationships in Tibetan Buddhism as an Example
objective element." A shred of doubt remains. Rejecting the truth claims (are the 
allegations true?) and refusing to assess them (is it right what Sogyal is doing?) 
nonetheless enables Mr Martini to take a different perspective which foregrounds 
the specific nature of his relationship to Sogyal, as revealed by the following 
interview excerpt.
"For me, Sogyal Rinpoche is actually almost beyond the judgements because it's so/ 
it's (sighs) yes for me it's beyond my comprehension and I know, too, that I do really 
think some things, like how how can / how why and that's not my style, it, er er with 
any other person I'd say, pfhh that's unacceptable or something like that, but I, for me 
that's also a sort of test, like, if you, like a partner you allow to get away with things 
that you wouldn't let other people get away with because you know that it's a process 
one goes through." [62]
He brings in partner relationships, as we know them from love relationships, as 
an analogy that appears to determine his relationship to Sogyal. One would still 
stand by a lover if they were doing something bad, in the same way that one 
might forgive the idiosyncrasies and weaknesses of another person one loves 
and even forgive them when they are aggressive towards oneself,—because it's 
about the higher value of remaining true to one's love. His relationship to his 
teacher appears as a process that is beyond conventional judgements. It's not a 
matter of truth or morals, but, as in love, about the contexture of something that is 
bigger that transcends the here-and-now phenomena. The metaphor of the "test", 
in particular, points towards a broader context, of which his relationship to Sogyal 
can be seen as a here-and-now symbol. However, this way of framing also does 
not appear a hundred per cent stable across the course of the narrative, as 
evidenced by the words "actually almost", which have a limiting effect. [63]
That Mr Martini does not feel that the analogy describes his relationship to Sogyal 
completely accurately also becomes clear in the following sequence.
Mr Martini: "I really don't know how, how to describe it. I sometimes find it really 
difficult to get to the heart of it and somehow almost to accept those things, but I still 
sort of trust in this [relationship] and because he also stresses again and again, er 
and says, It's not me that's important. but the dharma29 and what, what it conveys and 
you are the ones who will pass it on/ who will keep it going. And this receiving in order 
to pass it on is a selfless way. And that is of course also very, that is it takes this a 
little, takes this this er self-centred completely (short laugh), yes."
Interviewer: "One's own self-centredness or his?"
Mr Martini: "His and one's own // o.k. // because / because it can easily / there's also 
a lot of criticism of him." [64]
Let us assign these remarks to the appropriate logical positions of the contextural 
analysis. As systems theorist Peter FUCHS (2015) has shown, love should by 
definition have included the whole person, which in this case would have meant 
being able to accept Sogyal unconditionally as an eccentric Tibetan whose 
29 The dharma refers to the Buddhist teachings.
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behaviour is indeed questionable. However, this does not appear unproblematic 
in Mr Martini's narrative. Otherwise, it would be possible for students to say that 
they love the Lama even if others see him as hedonistic, addicted to sex or in 
some other way deserving of criticism. [65]
However, Mr Martini manages to keep Sogyal in the position of an authentic 
master in a different way, i.e. by splitting him into Sogyal as a person and Sogyal 
as a teacher. In this way what is taught is placed outside of the alterity or 
subjectivity of the teacher, which one must love. Even if it is not possible to gain 
any certainty on the issue of whether Sogyal's behaviour is holy or appropriate for 
a wise Tibetan Lama, it is still a fact that Sogyal teaches the Dharma and that the 
students pass these teachings on. Accordingly, Mr Martini's trust in this 
relationship is grounded less in the quality of the relationship itself—here his 
doubts persist -, than it is in the task of propagating the Buddhist teachings. [66]
The teachings then appear on the one hand as objectifiable texts (it can be 
established that Sogyal refers to traditional, canonical sources) which can then be 
understood to—this the implicit message—proclaim a transcendent truth, and on 
the other hand as the interpersonal experience, that can be shared 
intersubjectively, that the teachings can be both received and passed on to 
others. However, the teacher's selflessness is thus reduced to his participation in 
the propagation of religious teachings. As, for example, we can say about a 
winner of the Nobel prize for physics that it he has won because of what he has 
said about and achieved in physics and his winning has nothing to do with how he 
behaves towards his wife or his students, in this case, too, how the spiritual 
master relates to himself and the world is blotted out in order to protect him from 
criticism. Accordingly, in this configuration, to refrain from being self-centred 
means to play a role and behave as if different ways of perceiving things or 
different points of view (the disconcerting and disturbing you-perspectives) do not 
exist. [67]
Mr Martini is able to immunise himself against criticism by dismissing the self in 
such a way that it has no effect on the configuration. He dismisses both his own 
"self-centredness" and that of the master ("his"). Anyone who propagates the 
teachings acts selflessly by definition, and his/her actions are therefore holy. Here 
we have a two-valued religious contexture which is determined by the polar 
opposites transcendent and immanent. Since here we are concerned with the 
transcendence that is a central element of the teachings of Tibetan Buddhism 
(but which is outside of the I-perspective and cannot therefore be evaluated from 
that position), what is understood as being immanent—thus as part of the 
perceptible everyday world—(e.g. strange behaviour on the part of the master or 
one's own doubts) is unimportant and is accordingly to be rejected or transposed. 
All that is left is the abstract form of the religion, the reference to transcendence. 
Once this abstract form of religion (reduced to transcendence and neglecting 
immanence) has become established, while it is possible that those in Mr 
Martini's own circles will talk about the criticism that is being voiced by various 
groups, he will point out that a spiritual master of this tradition (most of whom are 
male) cannot respond to accusations, since to do so would be to become 
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implicated in worldly disputes and thus subvert his status as bodhisattva (a 
person whose actions are informed not by selfishness, but solely by compassion 
for other beings). However, Mr Martini, too, is left with a fractured relationship to 
his master; he can only manage "somehow almost to accept those things". This is 
because he is confusing the relationship to the master that he sees as analogous 
to a love relationship with the religious system that the master embodies. If it 
were just a matter of the former he could easily say (like a wife to her husband), 
"He is someone who makes mistakes and has hurt many people, but I love him 
and will stand by him, whatever he has done". However, this is not possible within 
the framework of the religion of Tibetan Buddhism, which conditions all other 
positions in the configuration. That the system of reincarnate tulkus30 can produce 
people who are fallible, not holy (and who possibly even succumb to lust and 
other addictions) cannot be verbalised (at least, not in reference to one's own 
school). [68]
In sum, the configuration expressed in Mr Martini's position can be expressed as 
follows: the more doubts in the infallibility of his teacher arise, the more they have 
to be actively pushed aside, since to perceive serious transgressions would call 
into question the holiness of the position of the teacher in whom he wishes to 
believe and whose blessings he wants to receive. The more it appears to become 
evident that the Lama is a person with manifest weaknesses, the more a student 
must work on him- or herself to prevent the doubts from gaining the upper hand. 
[69]
4.3 Mr Schneider: Differentiating between person and role
The above two cases lead us to ask the following question: could the empty 
places that condition the arrangement of the teacher/student relationship, also be 
occupied by different values? Is it possible to retain an unbroken relationship to 
the teacher without closing one's eyes to his problematic behaviour? Let us see 
how this Mr Schneider deals with this in his narrative. Mr Schneider had been a 
member of the Rigpa organisation for over 20 years and had completed a three-
year retreat at Lerab Ling, Rigpa's main centre in France. In a conversation that 
we had with Mr Schneider in 2013 we asked him whether the level of spiritual 
development of his teacher was important for him.
Interviewer: "But theoretically a Lama doesn't have to be enlightened, now, I mean, 
that isn't the issue or [whether he is in fact] on that level or he's? [...]"
Mr Schneider: "I'd put it the other way round. Whether the Lama is enlightened or not 
is immaterial. Completely (unclear). Whether I can see the buddha qualities in a 
teacher and as a result bring my own buddha qualities to light. That's what's decisive. 
In other words, there's a Lama who says theoretically we could also profit from a 
butcher. I mean (a bell rings) a butcher as somebody who is actually accumulating 
bad karma, etc. Or who kills animals or (unclear). What's decisive is not what's going 
on with the Lama, but in my view what's decisive is always how I see it. Buddhism 
30 Tulkus are considered to be spiritual teachers (in the Tibetan tradition this applies almost 
exclusively to men) who can determine the form in which they are reincarnated themselves.
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assumes a radical... I'm just going to open the door. Buddhism makes the radical 
assumption that, that, that you can't say anything about how the outside world exists. 
(The bell rings again.) You can only [do that] through your own perception and how 
you look at the world. And there's like this thesis that if my perception is pure, the 
world will act towards me purely. And that's what I work on. So for me, I want my 
master to be a field that I can use to practise on and then he is enlightened so-to-
speak. And that's what I practise on."
Interviewer: "That is what's fascinating. That is in fact the point."
Mr Schneider: "And then the question is not, 'Is he enlightened?', but 'Am I seeing 
him?' And then I see at how many (laughing) points I keep bringing out my critical, 
evaluating, judgemental mind, again and again. And then, I don't know, if you look at 
Sogyal Rinpoche and think, 'Why is he so fat? Can he really be enlightened?' Then I 
think, aha, I've got a certain concept that a fat person can't be enlightened. Well, then 
I probably won't get there myself (laughs)." 
Interviewer: "Yes, yes."
Mr Schneider: "And that if I/ If I free my concept, so-to-speak, then a fat, or thin, or 
tall, or small person can be enlightened." [70]
Mr Schneider's answer is remarkable in a number of different ways. To start with, 
he rejects the question as to whether the Lama is enlightened or not ("Whether 
the Lama is enlightened or not is immaterial"). From that perspective the 
associated thoughts and doubts would also make no sense. For Mr Schneider 
what is decisive is rather the perspective itself, from which one reflects. If the 
Lama is considered enlightened, the observer develops a view in which their 
relationship to the Lama appears pure and perfect. Thus the Lama functions 
primarily as an opportunity to practise, to cultivate a view of the world that is not 
shaped by value judgements. Mr Schneider draws a comparison with a "butcher" 
(literally "meat seller") whom one could theoretically also choose as Lama and 
practice object. [71]
Thus, what is decisive here is not whether the teacher really has the abilities and 
virtues that are ascribed to him, but one's own reflections, that is, what the I 
attributes to the You. In this context the Lama is both an opportunity to practice 
seeing and perceiving without discriminating and without judging, which permits 
the practitioner, after a time, to see him- or herself mimetically reflected as pure 
and immaculate. If the flaws of the role model are no longer seen as problematic, 
one can also accept one's own flaws and comes to a view in which the world—
and above all the way oneself is in relation to the world—appears whole and 
natural. Insofar as one is able to adopt this way of relating to oneself and the 
world it goes without saying that the Lama's faults can be seen as what they are, 
weaknesses that people can simply have. Accordingly, there is no need to see 
the Lama as a superhuman being and his actions do not need to carry an aura of 
infallibility. [72]
Thus in the case of Mr Schneider we find someone who has a sophisticated 
perspective and is aware of its artificial nature, but sustains this perspective 
precisely because it is the only way to permit the associated way of seeing things 
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to be "real". Mr Schneider's reference to Sogyal Rinpoche's corpulence ("why is 
he so fat? Can he really be enlightened?") is interesting in this context. At first 
glance the implication is that the Lama is not able to keep his sensual desires 
under control and that he cannot therefore be considered holy. However, as he 
continues to reflect Mr Schneider then realises that the actual problem is that of 
remaining fixated on a specific concept of holiness, since this would prevent the 
practitioner from becoming enlightened him-/herself ("Then I think, aha, I've got a 
certain concept that a fat person can't be enlightened. Well, then I probably won't 
get there myself"). The sophisticatedness of this perspective lies in the fact that it 
includes the possibility that the Lama, too, can behave in violation of the ethical 
standards of the Buddhist teachings or act out of ignorance because he is not, in 
fact, enlightened. At the same time Mr Schneider brackets the associated 
implications for practice as of no importance because the issue is not what is the 
case, but one's own epistemic attitude (how I see other people and the world). [73]
Structurally Mr Schneider is no longer describing enlightenment or the 
enlightened master as something that is the case, but as a perspective from 
which one can reflect, which is borrowed from the sphere of what is not the case 
and can still, as the imaginary, have an epistemic effect in the here-and-now of 
daily living. Thus he is negating a way of seeing things or but he is not negating a 
specific set of facts (and he does not therefore need to deny the accusations of 
abuse nor push aside doubts associated with the evaluation of the facts). From 
such a perspective it is all the same (and thus also of no import) whether the 
Lama is holy, enlightened and perfect or whether he is not enlightened and is 
driven by his physical needs. This altered perspective opens up degrees of 
freedom for a person's own actions, because it is then possible to maintain one's 
relationship to the Lama even if one disapproves of his behaviour, and one can 
decide not to follow some of his instructions and may even consider some of the 
consequences of his behaviour to be disastrous. Unlike Mr Martini, Mr Schneider 
does not reduce the function of the Lama to a formal role, but rather sees his 
relationship to him as central. [74]
Thus if we now look once more at the contextural analysis we have four positions 
in the centre of the morphogram—the subjective poles of I and You and the 
objective poles of the observable behaviour of two bodies. When we analyse the 
configuration that Mr Schneider describes we see that the cut now lies exactly 
between the side that philosophy describes as factual in contrast to the 
transcendental sphere (the perceivable sphere of everyday life and the 
inaccessible spheres of the subjectivities of other sentient beings). This leads to a 
constellation where Mr Schneider has to experience the encounter with the You 
as a blessing, and consequently to experience his own extraordinarily intensely. 
This relationship constellation is not unknown in western thought, we need only 
think of the romantic era—the keyword here, for which there is no trivial definition, 
is "love". [75]
Accordingly, in an interview that was conducted after the content of the open 
letter had been made public, Mr Schneider described that he actually still wanted 
to love Sogyal—or to have loved him. However, the real tragedy with which he 
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now had to deal was the fact that he was infinitely grateful to or loved somebody 
who had evidently severely disappointed the expectations of his students. [76]
It is important to understand and to stress once again that neither does this 
configuration make it necessary for Mr Schneider to negate or blank out facts 
related to Sogyal's misconduct, nor does it put the Lama on a pedestal and see 
him as an almighty and infallible being. Thus this configuration is not grounded in 
religious concepts that require faith or superstition. Rather, we land in a 
spirituality that is rooted in the uncertainty of the Thou-perspective and the 
associated impermanence and unpredictability, in the sense that love can be 
tragic. [77]
5. Self-Immunising Configurations—a Brief Discussion 
A comparison of the above three interviews reveals that it is not possible to 
consider interpretations of a spiritual teacher's troubling behaviour in isolation 
from the context of other positions on which these interpretations depend. Each 
of our interviewees refer to different "configurations", all of which sustained the 
ambivalence that arose in connection with the teacher's problematic behaviour. [78]
Ms Klinge, a novice, is still undecided and vacillating between doubt and the hope 
that she will be able to believe in the teacher's power and integrity. This mode of 
relating is conditioned by her community of practitioners, which affirms the 
teacher's role. Most of the advanced students have already settled for a response 
that consists in actively pushing their doubts aside, even if this does not help 
them to calm their turbulent inner and outer relationships to the teacher. For them 
it their spiritual practice and their participation in and support of the religious 
institutions that make that practice possible seem more important than their 
personal doubts, and this justifies their not looking more closely at it. In turn, 
within the community of practitioners this reinforces the attitude that critical 
questions are to be seen as the personal and subjective problems of the critics. [79]
A few individual highly experienced students arrive at a configuration that permits 
them to perceive the weaknesses of the Rigpa teachers (most of whom are men), 
but without denying the importance of the relationship. However, since this 
configuration is also a highly subjective view of the problem, it fails to change the 
fundamental configuration of the "empty place grammar" within the Rigpa 
community, in other words the students' views of the problem seem to be purely 
subjective. Even if there are a few individuals who take a more differentiated 
view, this does not alter how others involved reconcile their values at other 
positions. This can only occur if a group of people go public—as happened in this 
case—when some students from the inner group published an open letter in 
order to produce new, meaningful speaker positions. Only such a collective 
performative action can bring about a fundamental shift in the social constellation. 
From that point on doubts about the Lama's problematic behaviour can no longer 
be regarded as a subjective problem that individuals need to deal with in private, 
but is an intersubjectively corroborated fact. To use the linguistic analytic tools 
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presented by GÉVAUDAN (2010), we see that significant others assume the 
responsibility to testify to something, in an "objective modality". [80]
However, from the perspective of the "empty-place grammar" of contextural 
analysis it is not sufficient for individual actors to perform this illocutionary speech 
act if they do not occupy a position that gives them a high level of authority (e.g. 
in the sphere of Tibetan Buddhism the Dalai Lama). As our analysis of the 
teacher-student relationship described by the novice Ms Klinge shows, even the 
opinion offered by her husband in an objectifying mode was not enough, as the 
students who want to believe in their teacher may continue to place their hopes 
on the promise that the Lama will give them spiritual guidance. Consequently, 
they view such a critical statement as merely the personal, subjective position of 
an individual which they do not share. The same mechanism is evident in 
interviews we have conducted with students who have dropped out, whose 
decision to leave is still seen at most as a (more or less regrettable) individual act 
which does not affect how each deals with the problem themself—and this 
despite the fact that those who left the community had been active members of it 
for decades. How can the insight that something is going really wrong be 
stabilised in such a system? In order to change the way the empty places 
mutually condition each other, interventions are needed that develop a social 
scenario that constellates the relationships between the group, its members and 
the teacher irreversibly, i.e. stabilises the realisation that something is wrong, so 
that it cannot be mitigated by shifting the attention to the subjective positions of 
individual persons who have complained. [81]
However, at the same time this shows that the problem of Rigpa and Tibetan 
Buddhism is more far-reaching than most of those involved presumably want to 
acknowledge. Due to the systemic relationships described above it will hardly be 
sufficient simply to replace the main teacher, since virtually all the people in 
important positions in the Rigpa community (and in particular the long-standing 
students and those who lead meditation groups) have been trained to push aside 
critical perceptions and to deal with them as a problem arising from their own 
attitude. This is also promoted by the teachings of Tibetan Buddhism. The 
associated tendency to idealise the teacher, which teachers can perceive as an 
invitation to abuse the power that has been vested in them, must be considered 
to be an inherent characteristic of the system of this spiritual community. To what 
extent the institutions of Tibetan Buddhism can find a way to counterbalance this 
which would correct the relationship between use and abuse is an issue that we 
cannot address here (for more on this subject see VOGD, 2019). [82]
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6. Fields of Application of Contextural Analysis and its Relationship 
to the Documentary Method 
The methodological approach we have presented above has many potential fields 
of application. It is suitable in all cases where the subject matter can be expected 
to involve the simultaneous presence of different logics of action and canons of 
values. Its usefulness for exploring organisational logics and values is obvious. It 
also seems to be equally fruitful in research in psychiatry and on psychotherapy, 
since in these fields diverging standpoints are to be expected and thus 
attributions of what appears to be subjective or objective can be analysed without 
preconceptions and depending on the concrete specifics of the attributions made 
in interactions. It can also be employed to investigate issues in the educational 
sciences. Following GÜNTHER (1976a, 1976b), MAROTZKI (1990) had 
conceived of learning as a transformation of self and world relations, but was not 
yet able to present the theoretical considerations in the sense of an empirically 
useful methodology. Contextural analysis can, of course, equally well be 
employed in the analysis of the multiple ways in which subjectivity is produced in 
the modern world, since in this case it postulates modes of relating to the self that 
are theoretically complex and alienated. [83]
Using this methodology it is also possible to switch systematically between a local 
perspective (the "configuration" of specific actors) and the morpho- or empty-
place grammar of overarching configurations. This reveals the systemic 
interdependencies without reducing the local and global levels of analysis in a 
way that leads to causal and deterministic conclusions, e.g. making a direct link 
between the levels of psychological systems, social systems and communication. 
[84]
A further advantage is that this approach offers points of conjunction with a 
phenomenology that is oriented towards embodiment, as developed by Maurice 
MERLEAU-PONTY (1968 [1964]), in particular. One of MERLEAU-PONTY's most 
important achievements was to shift KANT's "transcendental" subjectivity (1998 
[1781], pp.91ff.), that is, an abstract construct defining an I that is posited to be a 
priori, back into the level of being, into the concrete practice of embodied 
interactions. However, this means that we can also no longer draw on a 
conception of language or rules that is founded on transcendental logic when we 
are discussing the problem of intersubjectivity. The only empirical reference point 
is the way in which the links between reciprocal embodied practices are linked to 
each other over time. We can then look at the links between these embodied 
practices, which arise in interdependent origination,—or at how they are 
configured.31 [85]
The practitioners' own experiences and those of others are brought together in a 
back-and-forth of reflections. Each of these reflections creates a concrete 
31 As MERLEAU-PONTY phrased it: "The phenomenological world is not pure being, but the 
sense which is revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where 
my own and other people's intersect and engage each other like gears. It is thus inseparable 
from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when I either take up my past 
experiences in those of the present, or other people's in my own" (2005 [1962], p.xviii).
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configuration in which unity and difference, subject and object, we and the others, 
concrete and abstract entities can emerge, depending on the respective situation
—i.e. in a concrete practice context. As in the theory of polycontexturality, in 
MERLEAU-PONTY (1968 [1964]) it is also not possible to capture this 
differentiation from the perspective of a hierarchy of grounds and justifications 
(since "transcendental" subjectivity and intersubjectivity can likewise no longer be 
seen as the primary foundation). There is no longer any foundation, but only a 
complex hierarchy of multiple practices that support each other reciprocally. 
Similarly, reflection and rationality can no longer be situated outside of these 
practices. To quote MERLEAU-PONTY: "Rationality is precisely proportioned to 
the experiences in which it is disclosed. To say that there exists rationality is to 
say that perspectives blend, perceptions confirm each other, a meaning 
emerges" (2005 [1962], p.xviii). Whether we will or no, here we find a mode of 
constituting practices in which meaning, rationality and, of course, also the other 
phenomena that must be seen as emerging ways of relating to ourselves and the 
world, must be considered to be by-products of interdependent origination. The 
links between the phenomenological perspective and a polycontextural 
perspective, including the location of speech in the lived body, are explored in 
detail in VOGD (2018). The present article closes a further gap in the 
methodological explication—the connection with the linguistic interpretation of 
polyphonic speech acts. [86]
The main basis for the development of contextural analysis was the documentary 
method (BOHNSACK, 2014). As mentioned in the introduction, above, the 
starting point for this methodological expansion was the fact that in the results we 
obtained in our research on organisations we discerned multiple frames that we 
could no longer leave unaddressed in the data analysis.32 We therefore looked to 
systems theory to find ways of expanding our methods that were suitable for 
describing and reconstructing these configurations and relationships. As is well-
known, the documentary method includes stages of analysis which are referred to 
as "formulating" and "reflecting interpretation", the latter being augmented and 
further developed by conducting systematic comparative analyses. Contextural 
analysis begins with a special form of reflecting interpretation which is used to 
reconstruct modes of relating to the self and others. At the same time the method 
also follows the central metatheoretical assumption of the documentary method 
according to which the ontological and epistemic positionings and orientations in 
any practice arise from a "transpersonal" configuration. They are conditioned by 
an overarching network of relationships. We can thus state, in line with the 
excerpt from BUTLER (2005) cited at the beginning of this article, that even what 
appears to be our innermost subjectivity results from relational dynamics. This is 
also consistent with the praxeological principles developed by BOHNSACK 
(2014) and BOURDIEU (1990 [1980]), according to which persons do not 
consciously select an ontology or an epistemology which allows them to relate to 
the world (and themselves), but are connected together in networks of practices 
32 See by way of comparison the development of the institutional logics approach (THORNTON et 
al., 2012), which is similar. However in this approach, the question as to how different logics can 
be related to one another, in particular has received little attention, since it has remained too 
narrowly focused on the perspective of the actors.
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that strongly influence how they experience and act, which in turn determines 
their practices. [87]
However, one difference between the polyphony of contextural analysis and the 
concept of the habitus or the frame of orientation, as BOHNSACK conceptualised 
it in the strict sense in his early work (e.g. 1998), consists in the fact that the latter 
were understood primarily as resulting from homogeneous orientations that 
evolved in a more or less uniform social field where the modes of existence 
(LATOUR, 2013) were similar. Discussions in groups whose members have 
similar orientations in regard to the aspect under examination are the 
methodological royal road to collecting data on and reconstructing such 
configurations (BOHNSACK, 2010a; BOHNSACK, PRZYBORSKI & SCHÄFFER, 
2005).The data analysis is conducted on passages with a high intensity of 
interaction and in which there is a high level of consensus or, where there are 
divergences, which show a conflict between two competing orientations.33 In 
contrast, contextural analysis throws light on practices that are used to structure 
differing perspectives into a configuration. It thus broadens the view to include 
polyphony from the start, but without excluding the possibility that certain voices 
may sound together in a single homogeneous symphony. With contextural 
analysis it is therefore possible to conduct a systematic analysis of relationships 
and configurations where there is systemic tension and which are distributed 
across different positions and value orientations. [88]
However, even in more recent developments of the documentary method we find 
approaches that attempt to capture people's ways of relating to themselves and 
the world and their associated frames of orientation in more complex ways (see 
KRZYCHALA, 2019 for another attempt to make use of BAKHTIN's categories in 
the documentary method). For instance, BOHNSACK (2016) spoke of the 
"double multidimensionality of the experiential spaces in organisations" (p.248). 
What he means is that on the one hand members of organisations have to handle 
how they are forced to frame them others that go against their original action 
orientations, while on the other hand there has always been a certain tension 
between their habitual orientations and the normative identity concepts of societal 
common sense (for a more detailed explanation see BOHNSACK, 2017). From a 
praxeological perspective we then need to see how actors relate these differing 
perspectives to each other in everyday practices. The perspectivisations that 
prove successful in everyday practice themselves follow a logic of practice and 
can also be seen as an expression of the "document sense" which is one of the 
pillars of the documentary method (e.g. BOHNSACK, 2010a, p.313, following 
MANNHEIM, 1964). The document sense is supraindividual per se, since it is not 
dependent on the intentional actions of individual actors, but results from the 
history of the conflicts between complex social (and socio-technical) networks. 
The complexity of these perspectivisations is evident in the transcripts of 
qualitative interviews (be it narrative interviews, group discussions or expert 
interviews), which can be analysed using contextural analysis as described in this 
article, in a way that stays close to the text. Likewise, the practical sense 
33 For a discussion of the organisation of discourse in the coherent and divergent modes see 
PRZYBORSKI (2004).
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(understood as in BOURDIEU's concept of habitus) always emerges as the 
product of how the perspectivisations develop over time, as expressed in the 
sequentiality of texts and the refined embedding of different speaker positions 
with differing ontological and epistemic statuses. [89]
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